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The use of personal connections to circumvent 
formal procedures by soliciting personal favours 
for and from others prevails in all societies to vary-
ing degrees. This is known as guanxi in China (Chen 
et al. 2011, 2013; Luo 2011; Yang and Wang 2011), 
wasta in the Arab world (Smith et al. 2011), jeitinho in 
Brazil (Ardichvili et al. 2010; Ferreira et al. 2012), ‘pull-
ing strings’ in English speaking countries (Smith et 
al. 2012), blat in post-Soviet spaces (Ledeneva 2008, 
2009, 2013), vrski in FYR Macedonia, veze in Serbia, 
Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and vruzki in 
Bulgaria. The reason this practice is important to study 
is because it hinders the development of meritocratic 
processes and results in the persistence of cronyism, 
nepotism and corruption. The aim of this paper is to 
contribute to the advancement of knowledge on this 
practice by evaluating the prevalence and distribution 
of vruzki in Bulgaria and discusses how it can be ex-
plained and tackled. Until now, no known empirical 
studies have been undertaken of vruzki. The intention 
in this paper is to start to fill this gap. 
Colin C. Williams, Junhong Yang
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The aim of this paper is to evaluate the prevalence and distribution of the use of personal connections to cir-
cumvent formal procedures by soliciting favours for and from others, known as vruzki, and how this can be 
explained and tackled. Reporting data from 2,005 face-to-face interviews conducted in late 2015 in Bulgaria, 
the finding is that 30 per cent of respondents had used vruzki in the 12 months prior to the survey, particu-
larly when accessing medical services and finding a job. Estimating a logit model and then calculating the 
marginal effects, the population groups significantly more likely to have used vruzki are those whose norms, 
values and beliefs are not in symmetry with the formal laws and regulations, perceiving the penalties and 
detection risks as higher, those reporting their financial situation as very comfortable, and the highest in-
come groups, but also younger people, the unemployed, and those living in larger households. The paper 
concludes by discussing the theoretical and policy implications along with the future research required. 
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In the first section of this paper, therefore, the ex-
isting literature will be reviewed on the use of per-
sonal networks to circumvent formal procedures to 
get things done. This will reveal that despite the use 
of personal connections to circumvent formal proce-
dures being studied elsewhere in the world, there has 
been very little focus upon its prevalence and usage 
in South-East Europe. To fill this gap, the second sec-
tion introduces a study of the use of vruzki in Bulgaria 
based on 2,005 face-to-face interviews conducted in 
late 2015. The third section then reports the findings. 
This will display the prevalence of vruzki and who uses 
it, along with how it can be explained and tackled, 
by estimating a logit model and then calculating the 
marginal effects. The final section then draws some 
conclusions and explores how these corrupt practices 
can be eradicated. 
USING PERSONAL CONNECTIONS TO 
CIRCUVENT FORMAL PROCEDURES
All countries have to produce, distribute and allo-
cate goods and services. Three separate ways of doing 
this are commonly differentiated, namely the ‘market’ 
(private sector), ‘state’ (public sector) and ‘community’ 
(informal or third) sectors (Giddens 1998; Gough 2000; 
Polanyi 1944; Thompson et al. 1991). The notion that 
these are separate realms is brought starkly into the 
question when examining the use of personal net-
works to circumvent formal procedures because it re-
veals the permeation of the private and public sectors 
by the informal realm. 
Social networks have been recognised as resourc-
es that populations draw upon to meet their needs 
ever since the studies by Stack (1974) and Young and 
Wilmott (1975), which emphasised the beneficial ef-
fects of the help provided by and for close ties. In re-
cent decades, moreover, the social capital literature 
has also highlighted the beneficial effects arising 
when ties are forged between people who do not 
know each other very well (Putnam 2000), or what 
Granovetter (1973) calls the ‘strength of weak ties’. The 
resulting emphasis has been on the positive effects of 
the help provided by and for not only close ties (i.e. 
‘bonding’ social capital) but also the weaker ties of 
people who do not know each other well (i.e. ‘bridg-
ing’ social capital) (Gittell and Vidal 1998; Putnam 
2000).
A smaller literature, however, has highlighted how 
social capital also has a more negative ‘darker side’ 
(Ayios et al. 2014; Garigiulo and Benassi 1997; Gu et al. 
2008; Putze, 1997; Schulman and Anderson 2009). This 
has shown how the use of social networks can result 
in cronyism (i.e., helping acquaintances and friends), 
nepotism (i.e., favouritism to kin), and/or corruption 
(i.e., the use of public office for private gain), as well as 
hinder meritocracy (Ayios et al. 2014). 
Exemplifying this ‘dark side’ of social capital is the 
use of social networks to circumvent formal proce-
dures. In China, guanxi (‘connections’) describes a net-
work of contacts from whom favours can be received 
in terms of accessing a good or service or bypassing 
bureaucratic procedures, which must then be recip-
rocated in the future (Hsuing 2013; Mikhailova and 
Worm 2003). Indeed, it is seen as extensively used 
in Chinese business and culture (Luo 2011; Luo et al. 
2011; Shou et al. 2014; Zhan 2012). Although a few 
studies draw attention to its negative effects, such as 
when nepotism prevails in job recruitment (Chen et 
al. 2011), most studies simply see it as an unavoidable 
feature that needs recognising when doing business 
in China (Chen et al. 2013; Munro et al. 2013; Yang and 
Wang 2011; Zhuang et al. 2010). 
In Arab countries meanwhile, wasta is the most 
common term used to describe connections rooted 
in family and kinship ties that are used to sidestep 
formal procedures (Hutchings and Weir, 2006; Smith 
et al., 2011), or ma’arifa in North African nations such 
as Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco (Mellahi and Wood 
2006; Yahiaoui and Zoubir 2006). Most studies in Arab 
countries again reveal a neutral or positive attitude to-
wards its usage (Bailey 2012; Barnett et al. 2013; Kilani 
and Sakijha 2002; Mohamed and Mohamed 2011; 
Tlaiss and Kauser 2011), with a ‘no nepotism’ policy 
being absent in the Arab business world and favourit-
ism, rather than merit, widely employed in hiring and 
promotion decisions. 
In Brazil and other Portuguese speaking countries, 
meanwhile, the term commonly used is either pistolão 
(‘contacts’) or jeitinho (‘find a way’) when referring to 
circumventing formal procedures by the use of con-
nections which again, is viewed as a helpful coping 
practice (Ardichvili et al. 2010). English-speaking coun-
tries employ the term ‘pulling strings’, which refers to 
favours obtained through often longstanding links 
with influential persons, often derived from family 
connections or shared schooling (Smith et al. 2012). A 
cross-national comparative study of attitudes reveals 
English people view the use of connections to circum-
vent formal procedures even more positively than the 
Chinese, Arabs and Brazilians (Smith et al. 2012). 
In the post-Soviet world, meanwhile, the use of per-
sonal networks to obtain goods and services in short 
supply, or circumvent formal procedures, is known as 
blat (Arnstberg and Boren 2003; Ledeneva 2006, 2008, 
2009, 2013; Mikhailova and Worm 2003; Smith et al. 
2011). Under the Soviet system, money had relatively 
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little value given the shortage of goods to purchase. 
It was thus more important to have a wide network 
of friends and acquaintances to call upon in times of 
need, and a commonly heard phrase during the Soviet 
period was ‘it is better to have a hundred friends than 
a hundred roubles’. Blat networks thus ‘loosened up 
the rigid constraints of the political regime’ (Ledeneva 
2009, p. 257) and was used to negotiate almost all 
aspects of life from acquiring everyday goods such 
as food, and periodic events such as holidays, to life-
cycle events such as obtaining kindergarten and uni-
versity places. Thus, blat in its traditional meaning in 
Soviet society was widely viewed in a positive or neu-
tral manner since it helped people to cope with the 
inefficiencies of the command economy. Indeed, blat 
was an important status symbol and source of pride 
and prestige for those able to help others (Williams et 
al. 2013). Few therefore regarded such friendly help 
as being in anyway a corrupt practice (Williams et al. 
2013). The consensus in the literature is that the use 
of connections to gain preferential access to services 
persists in post-Soviet societies, but that connec-
tions and access to assets are increasingly treated as 
a commodity, with gifts and/or money received and 
given for this (Ledeneva 2009, 2013 Onoshchenko and 
Williams 2013, Williams and Onoshchenko 2014a,b). Al 
Ramahi (2008) has noted a similar trend in relation to 
wasta. Indeed, this is reflected in recent studies. Take, 
for example, the study of informality in health ser-
vices. Rather than study blat, studies now focus upon 
the use of informal payments to gain access to medi-
cal services (Gordeev et al. 2014; Kaitelidou et al. 2012; 
Stepurko et al. 2013; Williams et al. 2016). 
In South-East Europe, meanwhile, such connec-
tions are variously referred to as vrski in Macedonian, 
veze in Serbia and vruzki in Bulgaria. Until now, not 
only is there hardly any scholarly literature, with the 
notable exception of Chavdarova (2013) who has dis-
cussed vruzki, but there are also no known empirical 
studies of the prevalence and usage of connections 
in South-East Europe. Despite this, the use of con-
nections to circumvent formal procedures is widely 
discussed in popular culture and is often at the heart 
of many critiques by Bulgarians of how their society 
operates. Such connections are seen to help create 
significant privileges for individuals connected to the 
ruling powers and state apparatus, as well as to pri-
vate firms and their owners. However, it is also some-
times seen more positively as a way of getting things 
done. Until now, nevertheless, empirical studies of the 
prevalence and distribution of vruzki in contemporary 
Bulgarian society are notable by their absence. So too 
are studies which evaluate how this practice might be 
explained and tackled. 
To explain the use of connections and to consider 
ways of tackling this practice, one way forward is to 
apply to the study of vruzki the theoretical perspec-
tives used to explain and tackle undeclared work. As 
the literature on undeclared work, two dominant per-
spectives have been adopted (Williams and Horodnic 
2015a,b, 2017). First, a rational economic actor ap-
proach has argued that people weigh up the costs 
and benefits of engaging in such activities and de-
cide to do so when the benefits outweigh the costs 
(Allingham and Sandmo, 1972). The resultant policy 
approach, which has been widely adopted, is to raise 
the costs by increasing the perceived and/or actual 
penalties and risks of detection. In recent years, how-
ever, there has been recognition that many citizens do 
not engage in such illicit activities even when the ben-
efits outweigh the costs, and this has resulted in the 
emergence of a social actor approach. Viewed through 
the lens of institutional theory (Baumol and Blinder 
2008; North 1990), every society is seen to possess 
both formal institutions, namely laws and regulations 
defining the legal rules of the game, as well as informal 
institutions, namely ‘socially shared rules, usually un-
written, that are created, communicated and enforced 
outside of officially sanctioned channels’ (Helmke and 
Levitsky 2004, p. 727). From this viewpoint, the greater 
is the asymmetry between the formal institutions (i.e., 
‘state morale’) and informal institutions (i.e., ‘citizen 
morale’), the greater will be the participation in such 
illicit activities (Williams and Franic 2015; Williams and 
Horodnic 2015a,b, 2017; Williams et al. 2014). Indeed, 
this has been recently highlighted to be the case in 
the specific context of Bulgaria, albeit only in relation 
to entrepreneurs (Williams and Vorley, 2016). To tackle 
illicit activities, therefore, there is a need to reduce the 
level of asymmetry between the formal and informal 
institutions. Here, for the first time, these theoreti-
cal perspectives can be applied to study of the use of 
personal connections using a case study of vruzki in 
Bulgaria. 
 
 DATA AND VARIABLES
 Data
To evaluate the prevalence and distribution of vru-
zki in contemporary Bulgarian society, as well as how 
it might be explained and tackled, data is reported 
from 2,005 face-to-face interviews conducted in 
Bulgaria in late 2015. This household survey included 
questions on whether respondents used and provid-
ed favours to circumvent formal procedures, and the 
spheres in which they did so, as well as questions on 
their perceptions regarding the penalties and risks of 
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detection when participating in illicit activities, and 
whether they view engagement in illicit activities as 
acceptable so as to measure the level of symmetry 
between their morale and the state morale of formal 
institutions. To collect this data, a multi-stage random 
(probability) sampling methodology was used to en-
sure that on the issues of gender, age, region and lo-
cality size, the national level sample, as well as each 
level of the sample, was representative in proportion 
to its population size. In every household the ‘closest 
birthday’ rule was applied to select respondents, while 
every subsequent address was determined by the 
standard ‘random route’ procedure. 
Variables
To evaluate the use of vruzki, the dependent vari-
able used is a dummy variable with recorded value 1 
for respondents who answered ‘yes’ to the question: 
“Have you in the last 12 months asked anyone for a 
favour/help using connections in any of the follow-
ing spheres?”, and zero otherwise if they had not used 
vruzki. The spheres analysed were: medical services 
(skipping queue, getting better examination, surgery); 
solving problems with the law enforcing authorities 
(traffic police, customs); finding a job; education (plac-
es in higher education/ obtaining degree/diploma 
etc.); legal services and courts; everyday services at 
better quality or better price (e.g., bank services, hair-
dressers); repairs (housing, garages, car); tickets for 
events, theatre, concerts; hobbies and entertainment, 
tourist resorts, travel tickets; consumer goods exclud-
ing foodstuffs; communicating with local authori-
ties on business matters (e.g. delaying tax payment); 
foodstuffs; speeding up bureaucratic procedures (e.g. 
at the municipal hall), and any other realms. This ena-
bled the degree to which it is used in each of these 
spheres to be analysed. 
To evaluate the distribution of vruzki, meanwhile, 
the following independent variables were analysed, 
derived from wider studies evaluating the associated 
issue of the important socio-demographic and socio-
economic variables influencing participation in un-
declared work (Williams and Horodnic 2015a,b, 2016; 
Williams and Padmore 2013a,b): 
 – Gender: a dummy variable with value 0 for wom-
en and 1 for men.
 – Age: an interval variable indicating the exact age 
of the respondent.
 – Marital status: a categorical variable with value 
1 for married/remarried, value 2 for cohabiting 
and value 3 for single/divorced.
 – Household size: a categorical variable with value 
0 for one person, value 1 for two persons, val-
ue 3 for three persons, value 4 for four or more 
persons.
 – Occupation: a categorical variable with value 0 
for unemployed, value 1 for self-employed, val-
ue 2 for employed and value 3 for other (retired, 
students, disabled, etc).
 – Financial situation: a categorical variable with 
value 0 for no money problems, value 1 for just 
comfortable, value 2 for maintaining, and value 
3 for struggling.
 – Net income: a categorical variable of the net in-
come of individuals with value 0 for no income, 
value 1 for less than €350 per month, value 2 
for €350-700, value 3 for €701-1000, value 4 for 
€1001-1300, value 5 for €1301-1800 and value 6 
for more than €1800 per month.
 – Type of locality: a categorical variable with value 
0 for rural area or village, value 1 for small or 
middle-sized town, value 2 for large urban area. 
 – Regions: a categorical variable with value 0 for 
North Central, value 1 for North Eastern, value 
2 for North Western, value 3 for South Central, 
value 4 for South Eastern, and value 5 for South 
Western.
To evaluate the competing ways of explaining and 
tackling vruzki, three explanatory variables were used. 
Firstly, to evaluate whether the perceived risk of detec-
tion influences engagement, a dummy variable was 
used describing the perceived risk of being detected, 
with value 0 for a very small and fairly small risk, value 
1 for fairly high risk and very high risk. Secondly, to 
evaluate how penalties are associated with participa-
tion, a dummy variable was employed, describing the 
expected sanctions, with value 0 for those asserting 
that the normal tax or social security contributions 
would be due, value 1 for those stating that the nor-
mal tax or social security contributions due, plus there 
would be a fine or for imprisonment. 
Third and finally, to evaluate the association be-
tween engagement in vruzki and the level of insti-
tutional asymmetry, an interval variable was used 
by constructing an index of self-reported attitudes 
towards the acceptability of various illicit activities 
based on a 10-point Likert scale. Rather than use a 
single question to assess the gap between citizen and 
state morale (i.e., the level of institutional asymmetry), 
this survey uses a range of questions by asking the 
following: 
Now I would like to know how you would rate vari-
ous actions or behaviours. For each of them, please 
tell me to what extent you find it acceptable or not. 
Please use the following scale: “1” means that you 
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find it absolutely unacceptable and “10” means 
that you find it absolutely acceptable: (1) someone 
receives welfare payments without entitlement; 
(2) an individual is hired by a household for work 
and s/he does not declare the payment received to 
the tax or social security authorities even though it 
should be declared; (3) A firm is hired by a house-
hold for work and it does not declare the payment 
received to the tax or social security authorities; (4) 
a firm is hired by another firm for work and it does 
not declare its activities to the tax or social security 
authorities; (5) a firm hires an individual and all or a 
part of the wages paid to him\her are not officially 
declared and (6) someone evades taxes by not de-
claring or only partially declaring their income.
Collating the responses to these six questions, 
and giving equal weighting to each response, an ag-
gregate ‘citizen-state morale alignment index’ is con-
structed for each individual. The Cronbach’s Alpha 
coefficient of the scale is 0.87 which shows a good in-
ternal consistency of the scale (Kline 2000). The index 
is represented here in the 10-point Likert scale origi-
nal format. The lower the index value, the higher is the 
citizen morale (i.e., the more aligned is citizen morale 
with state morale).
Given that there were a considerable number of 
missing values and inconclusive answers (i.e., refusal 
and ‘don’t know’) across the dependent and inde-
pendent variables, multiple imputation was used 
to predict the values. This is done using a system of 
chained equations for each variable with missing val-
ues, with 50 imputations simulated for each missing 
value. Furthermore, population weights are applied 
based on age and gender to correct for under- and 
over-representation in the sample. Table 1 provides 
a summary of the key variables that includes the 
number of observations, mean values, and missing 
data. None of the independent variables are highly 
correlated. 
To analyse its usage in different realms, descriptive 
statistics are presented. To evaluate who is significant-
ly more likely to use vruzki in contemporary Bulgarian 
society, as well as the explanations and how it might 
be tackled, a logit model is estimated and then the 
marginal effects calculated. Below, the results are 
reported.
 FINDINGS
Examining the nationally representative sample 
of 2,005 respondents interviewed face-to-face in late 
2015 in Bulgaria, just 5 per cent held the view that the 
use of vruzki was not important in order to get things 
done. Some 21 per cent asserted that it is somewhat 
important, 41 per cent that it is important, and 33 per 
cent that it is very important. This is reflected in the 
findings on whether they used vruzki to get things 
done. Some 30 per cent of all respondents surveyed 
had used vruzki in the last 12 months in order to cir-
cumvent formal processes. 
Analysing the spheres in which the respondents 
had used vruzki to get things done, 13 per cent had 
used vruzki to gain access to medical services (e.g., 
jumping the queue, getting a better examination), 12 
per cent to find a job, 8 per cent to get repairs (e.g., to 
their home or car), 6 per cent to gain access to every-
day services such as hairdressers and bank services, 4 
per cent to acquire food, 4 per cent to gain access to 
Table 1:  Summary statistics of key variables.
Variable Mean SD Min Median Max N(missing)
Use vruzki 0.300 0.460 0 0 1 49
Tax morale 1.93 1.85 0 1.3 10 116
Detection risk 0.26 0.44 0 0 1 321
Expected sanctions 0.62 0.49 0 1 1 545
Women 0.52 0.5 0 1 1 0
Age 47.68 17.32 15 48 85 0
Marital status 1.71 0.9 1 1 3 16
Household Size 2.67 1.02 1 3 4 0
Employment status 3.09 0.9 1 3 4 0
Financial situation 3.15 0.71 1 3 4 21
Personal income 2.72 1.08 1 3 7 105
Locality type 2.2 0.86 1 2 3 0
Regions 4.02 1.74 1 4 6 0
Notes: This table reports summary statistics of key variables. We use sampling weights to ensure that our statistics are rep-
resentative of the population. 
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consumer goods (excluding food), 3 per cent to solve 
problems with the law enforcement authorities such 
as the traffic police or customs, 3 per cent to speed up 
bureaucratic procedures with the public administra-
tion, 3 per cent to deal with the legal services and the 
courts, 2 per cent to gain access to education such as 
places in higher education or obtain a degree or di-
ploma, 2 per cent to gain access to their hobbies or 
entertainment, travel tickets and so forth, 2 per cent 
communicate with local authorities on business mat-
ters such as delaying a tax payment, and 1 per cent to 
access tickets for events, the theatre or concerts. 
When it is recognised that not all respondents 
needed to obtain these services in the past 12 months 
(e.g., medical services, finding a job, solving problems 
with the law enforcement authorities), vruzki appears 
to be commonly used to get things done. Indeed, for 
future research, enumerating whether respondents 
had engaged with these realms in the past year before 
asking them whether vruzki had been used, would be 
useful so as to evaluate the proportion of instances 
in which vruzki is used. Here, therefore, it can only be 
concluded that vruzki appears to be very commonly 
used when gaining access to medical services, find-
ing a job, dealing with legal services and the courts, 
and accessing education, which are activities that only 
a relatively small proportion would have accessed in 
the year prior to the survey, and less commonly used 
when acquiring foodstuffs and consumer goods, 
which are activities that most would have engaged in 
during the year prior to the survey. 
Who, therefore, uses vruzki in order to get things 
done in Bulgaria? Table 2 estimates a logit model and 
calculates the average marginal effects. This investi-
gates whether individual socio-demographic, socio-
economic and spatial variables are significantly associ-
ated when other variables are taken into account and 
held constant. For continuous independent variables, 
the average marginal effects provide a good approxi-
mation to the probability of the change in vruzki that 
will be impacted by a one-unit change in the vari-
able. And, varying one dummy variable from ‘0’ to ‘1’ 
changes the mean probability, taking into account all 
explanatory variables. Starting with the socio-demo-
graphic variables, this reveals that there are no signifi-
cant gender variations in the use of vruzki. However, 
age does have a significant influence on its usage; 
younger age groups are more likely to use vruzki than 
older age groups. So too are larger households with 
four or more adults more likely to use connections 
Table 2:  Marginal effects after logit estimate of the propensity to use personal connections in Bulgaria
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Marginal effect
(Standard error)
Marginal effect
(Standard error)
Marginal effect
(Standard error)
Women -0.010 -0.011 -0.009
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Age -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Marital status: (BG: Married/Remarried)
- Cohabitating 0.010 0.000 0.008
(0.033) (0.032) (0.033)
- Single 0.049 0.049* 0.048
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
Household Size: (BG: One Person)
- Two 0.048 0.050 0.049
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038)
- Three 0.038 0.037 0.036
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040)
- Four or more 0.078* 0.080** 0.080*
(0.040) (0.041) (0.041)
Employment status: (BG: Unemployed)
- Self-employed -0.067 -0.065 -0.066
(0.070) (0.071) (0.071)
- Employed -0.166*** -0.168*** -0.168***
(0.049) (0.049) (0.049)
 - Other (Retired, students, disabled, etc.) -0.139*** -0.142*** -0.137***
(0.044) (0.044) (0.044)
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to get things done than single person households. 
Turning to the socio-economic variables, the finding 
is that the employed and economically inactive are 
significantly less likely than the unemployed to use 
connections, as are those reporting their financial 
situation as struggling, maintaining or comfortable 
Table 2: Continued
Financial situation (BG: Very comfortable)
- Just comfortable -0.218** -0.204** -0.218**
(0.101) (0.102) (0.101)
- Maintaining -0.212** -0.203** -0.219**
(0.101) (0.102) (0.101)
- Struggling -0.165 -0.156 -0.172*
(0.104) (0.105) (0.104)
Personal income (BG: No income)
- Less than 350 euros 0.057 0.046 0.051
(0.039) (0.040) (0.039)
- 350-700 euros 0.085** 0.075* 0.082*
(0.043) (0.044) (0.043)
- 700-1000 euros 0.102* 0.098* 0.100*
(0.054) (0.055) (0.055)
 - 1000-1300 euros 0.124* 0.125* 0.124*
(0.065) (0.066) (0.065)
- 1300-1800 euros 0.257** 0.268** 0.263**
(0.114) (0.115) (0.114)
- More than 1800 euros 0.371** 0.371*** 0.363**
(0.148) (0.143) (0.145)
Locality type: (BG: Rural area)
- Small/medium town 0.034 0.027 0.028
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
- City 0.056** 0.055** 0.057**
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Regions (BG: North Central)
- North Eastern -0.140*** -0.117*** -0.136***
(0.042) (0.041) (0.042)
- North Western 0.154*** 0.182*** 0.174***
(0.048) (0.049) (0.049)
- South Central 0.116*** 0.140*** 0.126***
(0.041) (0.040) (0.041)
- South Eastern 0.058 0.085* 0.065
(0.045) (0.044) (0.045)
- South Western -0.121*** -0.116*** -0.126***
(0.038) (0.037) (0.038)
Tax morale 0.018*** 0.016*** 0.016***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Detection risk (BG: Very small/ Fairly small)
- Fairly high/Very high -0.067** -0.066**
(0.028) (0.029)
Expected sanctions (BG: contributions due)
- Plus a fine/ Prison -0.065** -0.064**
(0.028) (0.028)
Number of imputation 50 50 50
N 2005 2005 2005
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively.
Source: authors’ calculations from GREY survey
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significantly less likely to use connections than those 
reporting their financial situation as very comfortable. 
Similarly, the higher is the personal formal income of 
a respondent, the more likely they are to use vruzki 
to get things done. Indeed, those earning over €1800 
are 36.3 per cent more likely to have used vruzki in the 
past 12 months than those with no formal income. 
The use of vruzki is also significantly higher in urban 
than rural areas, and there are also significant regional 
variations in its usage. 
Turning to the explanations and policy approaches 
for tackling the use of connections, we include risk 
of detection and level of penalties separately in col-
umns 1 and 2. In column 3 we include them together 
in the model. The results remain the same. Models 1 
and 3 reveal that those perceiving high risk are less 
likely to use connections to circumvent formal proce-
dures, confirming the rational actor thesis. Based on 
the magnitude of the marginal effects in model 3, we 
find that those who perceive high risk (fairly high/very 
high) in comparison to those who perceive low risk 
(very small/fairly small) have 6.7% lower probability to 
be engaged in vruzki. In addition, models 2 and 3 re-
veals that those perceiving the sanctions to be higher 
are less likely to use connections to get things done. 
This, therefore, suggests that increasing penalties will 
reduce the likelihood of people using connections to 
get things done, as will increasing the risks of detec-
tion. For the variable of tax morale, the finding is that 
the greater is the asymmetry between citizens’ norms, 
values and beliefs, and the formal rules and regula-
tions, the greater is the likelihood of using vruzki to 
get things done, thus confirming the social actor ex-
planation and suggesting that tackling the asymme-
try between formal and informal institutions might be 
an effective policy approach. As a robustness check, 
an OLS model was estimated to see if the results are 
consistent. This was the case, providing further sup-
port for these findings. 
 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper has evaluated whether the social prac-
tice of using personal networks to circumvent formal 
procedures, known as vruzki, is prevalent in Bulgaria 
and who uses such connections. Reporting a survey 
of 2,005 respondents conducted in late 2015, the 
finding is that 30 per cent of respondents had used 
vruzki in the past 12 months to get things done, par-
ticularly when accessing medical services or finding 
a job. Estimating a logit model and then calculating 
the marginal effects, the population groups signifi-
cantly more likely to have used vruzki are those whose 
norms, values and beliefs are not in symmetry with 
the formal laws and regulations, those reporting their 
financial situation as very comfortable, and the high-
est income groups, but also younger people, the un-
employed, and those living in larger households. A 
limitation of this research is that respondents were not 
asked whether they had engaged with these realms in 
the past year before asking them whether vruzki had 
been used. For future research, this would be useful 
so as to evaluate the proportion of instances in which 
vruzki is used.
Nevertheless, theoretically, and when explaining 
the use of vruzki, this paper has evaluated the rational 
economic actor and social actor perspectives, derived 
from the study of undeclared work. This has revealed 
some support for the rational economic actor per-
spective that citizens engage in such endeavour when 
the benefits outweigh the costs. Increasing the penal-
ties for engaging in such illicit activity and the risks of 
detection reduces the likelihood of people using con-
nections to get things done. Moreover, strong support 
is found for the social actor approach. There is a strong 
statistically significant correlation between the use of 
vruzki and the level of institutional asymmetry; the 
greater is the asymmetry between citizens’ norms, val-
ues and beliefs, and the formal rules and regulations, 
the greater is the likelihood of using vruzki to get 
things done. This suggests that beyond a deterrence 
approach, tackling the asymmetry between formal 
and informal institutions is required in order to tackle 
this endeavour. 
How, therefore, can this illicit social practice be 
tackled? This has not before been considered in any 
known studies. Several policy options are available. 
On the one hand, governments can pursue its eradi-
cation using tougher penalties and increasing the 
risks of detection, although whether the political will 
exists to do this is open to question. On the other 
hand, it can be also tackled by reducing the asym-
metry between formal and informal institutions. To 
achieve this, firstly, attempts can be made to change 
the norms, values and beliefs of citizens (i.e., the in-
formal institutions) regarding the acceptability of 
such an illicit practice, such as by running awareness 
raising campaigns about the negative consequences 
of vruzki and the positive consequences of adopting 
meritocratic values across society. Secondly, it can also 
be pursued by modernising the formal institutions so 
as to reduce the formal institutional inefficiencies and 
imperfections that lead to vruzki being used. None 
of these are mutually exclusive approaches, and can 
be sequenced in different ways such as by organising 
an awareness raising campaign alongside improv-
ing modernising public services so as to reduce the 
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circumvention of formal procedures, and then follow-
ing this up with tougher penalties for those who still 
engage in these practices that result in nepotism, cro-
nyism and corruption. Whether this is the appropriate 
sequencing has not so far been evaluated. 
What is certain, however, is that on the whole, the 
use of vruzki cannot continue in a modern meritocratic 
society and doing nothing is not an option. Although 
there might be particular instances where this prac-
tice could be seen as positive and beneficial, it is on 
the whole a practice that results in nepotism, crony-
ism and corruption, and prevents the advent of meri-
tocratic allocation practices. If this paper therefore 
stimulates research on its prevalence and distribution 
across a wider array of countries, as well as greater 
debate on what needs to be done to eradicate this 
practice, including a two-way and three-way analysis 
of the interaction effects between the different policy 
measures, which is a limitation of the current research, 
then it will have achieved its intention. 
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